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INTRODUCTION
Prior to the commencement of the 2012 National Football
League (NFL) season, it became clear that a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) between the NFL and the NFL
Referees Association (NFLRA) was far from being signed. In
the NFL, like other professional sports leagues, collective
bargaining is often used to resolve labor disputes. In 2011,
the NFL and the National Football League Players
Association (NFLPA) also struggled to come to terms on a
collective bargaining agreement. Such negotiations create
drama for fans and commentators alike as they nervously
speculate as to whether there will be a strike or lockout and,
if so, when to expect the sport to resume. In 2012, it became
obvious that the referees would not reach an agreement in
time, and the NFL hired replacement referees for the
preseason. Eventually, these replacement referees went on to
call the first three weeks of regular season games. During
these weeks, the replacements referees were berated by
spectators, including NFL executives, for the calls that were
missed, ignored, or made improperly.
While fans complained fruitlessly, DeMaurice Smith, the
NFLPA Executive Director, also recognized the larger issue
that the replacement referees posed: player safety.1 Looking
past inaccuracies that affected only teams’ records, Smith
focused on the inadequacy of calls that left players vulnerable
to injury.2 Smith threatened a league-wide player strike until
the NFL and NFLRA reached a CBA.3
However,
commentators noted that the threat seemed hollow due to the
apparent inability of the players to strike under their own
collective bargaining agreement.4
The NFLPA and the NFL agreed to a CBA in 2011 that
explicitly included a “No Strike” Provision.5 In this CBA,
subject to a Union Security exception, any “strike, work
1. Simon Samano, DeMaurice Smith doesn’t rule out strike over referee lockout,
USA TODAY (Aug. 29, 2012), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/thehuddle/
post/2012/08/demaurice-smith-nfl-strike-replacement-refs/1#.UQQIVuivwh1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Alicia Jessop, Take the Field: Why the NFLPA Cannot Strike Over Replacement
Referees, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciajessop/2012/08/29/
take-the-field-why-the-nflpa-cannot-strike-over-replacement-referees/.
5. NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. 3 §1, August 4, 2011.
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stoppage, or other concerted action interfering with the
operations of the NFL” is impermissible.6 Thus Smith’s threat
of an immediate strike seemed to threaten a violation of the
NFLPA’s collective bargaining agreement.
However, § 143 of the National Labor Relations Act, added
by the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,7 designates
a specific instance during which a work stoppage is not
considered a strike.8 Under this section, an employee may
refuse work, in good faith, if he perceives an abnormally
dangerous condition exists in the work environment.9
Assuming this law is applicable, the NFLPA would have had
to establish that the replacement referees created an
abnormally dangerous condition for the players in order for a
strike to be permissible under their CBA. Ultimately, whether
or not an abnormally dangerous condition exists turns on the
interpretation of § 143 under existing precedent. If
established, a strike would have been a permissible option for
the players during the time the replacement referees were
used.
Part I of this Comment will offer a detailed analysis of the
NFL’s response to injuries, such as rule changes to protect
players. It will also explore the NFL’s broader response to
injuries in the game. Using the League’s past behavior and
the seriousness with which the League responds to injuries,
this section will also analyze the replacement referees’
qualifications to officiate a professional game. Part II will
consider the relevant rules of law regarding work stoppages.
Finally, Part III will apply the facts in the NFLPA’s situation
to the standards that have been developed regarding work
stoppage in the presence of a “No Strike” provision.
I. NFL INJURY HISTORY
In recent years, the NFL has taken seriously the potential
for injury during games, specifically with regard to hits that
have tendencies to produce concussions. As safety threats
became more salient, the NFL frequently adopts rules to
further player safety. As early as 1962 the NFL implemented
6. Id. at Art. 3 §1, Art. 47 §1, §6.
7. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 162 (June 23, 1947) (codified at 29
U.S.C. §143 (2012)).
8. 29 U.S.C. §143 (2012).
9. Id.
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a rule prohibiting grabbing a player’s facemask.10 Over the
next 15 years, the League sporadically implemented rules to
accommodate safety, until player protection became a
predominant interest of rule makers in 1979.11 This was
further emphasized in 1980 with the implementation of the
personal foul rule that prohibited “striking, swinging, or
clubbing on the head, neck or face.”12 In 1996, player safety
concerns ultimately led the NFL to designate helmet-tohelmet contact as a personal foul.13 However, before the NFL’s
interests changed and this rule was officially implemented,
the League often “turned a blind eye” to the dangerous plays
on the field.14 Meanwhile, coaches were encouraging this
unsafe play.15 Collectively, these rule changes testify to the
NFL’s intention to avoid injuries.
The NFL has even
acknowledged that particular contact, specifically head-tohead contact, does cause serious, preventable injury.16
Superficial injuries such as broken bones or torn muscles,
whether or not they are career ending, do not compare to the
effects of multiple concussions. A concussion, though
frequently regarded as a bruise to the brain from collision
with a hard surface, can in fact occur without any collision at
all and often will produce little to no swelling or bleeding in a
radiological scan.17 A concussion is common when “the head
10. History
of
the
NFL
Rules,
SPORTSATTIC.COM,
http://www.sportsattic.com/araig/NflRulesHistory.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
11. Id. (noting that in 1977, the rules implemented to lessen injuries included:
outlawing the head slap, prohibiting offensive linemen from thrusting their hands at an
opponent’s neck, face or head, prohibiting the clipping of wide receivers, and only
permitting defenders to make contact with eligible receivers once.); see also Jennifer
Ann Heiner, Concussions in the National Football League: Jani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle
NFL Player Ret. Plan and a Legal Analysis of the NFL’s 2007 Concussion Management
Guidelines, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 255, 271 (2008) (stating that “In 1979,
the NFL adopted major changes to increase player safety. The rules prohibited players
from blocking below the waist during kickoff and punt returns, and prevented the
players from wearing damaged equipment that could be potentially hazardous. Officials
were also to call a play dead when the quarterback was in the potentially dangerous
grasp of a defensive tackler.”).
12. SPORTSATTIC.COM, note 10; Heiner, supra note 11 at 271.
13. SPORTSATTIC.COM, supra note 10; Heiner, supra note 11 at 271.
14. Jeremy P. Gove, Three and Out: The NFL’s Concussion Liability and How
Players Can Tackle the Problem, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 649, 657 (2012).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Head Injuries in Football, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 21, 2010),
http://web.archive.org/web/20121017050303/http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/tim
estopics/subjects/f/football/head_injuries/index.html (accessed by searching for the
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either accelerates rapidly and then is stopped, or is spun
rapidly.”18 Without direct collision, what the brain is actually
being “stopped” by is the skull, and thus no helmet can truly
protect a player.19 What does protect players are the rules
implemented by the NFL to prevent concussions and the
referees trained to enforce these rules.
Additionally of concern is that, according to neurologists,
after one concussion, individuals are up to four times more
likely to suffer another—and with each successive concussion,
the required force to sustain a future concussion decreases. 20
In a 2000 survey of former NFL players, data indicated that
“60 percent had suffered at least one concussion in their
careers and 26 percent had had three or more.”21 The
individuals who had reported concussions also reported
symptoms of memory, concentration, and neurological
problems far more than those who had never suffered from a
concussion.22 In 2009, another study revealed that symptoms
of Alzheimer’s disease and other memory-related illnesses
occur in the NFL’s former players “vastly more often” than in
the general population.23 Furthermore, in 2007, a study found
that retired NFL players who had sustained three or more
concussions during their careers were three times more likely
to have clinical depression.24 These conditions, clearly the
result of brain injury, have manifested themselves repeatedly
in former NFL players.25
The result of these studies led the NFL in 2009 to
announce the imposition of its most “stringent rules to date
on managing concussions.”26 The following year, after several
concussions inside of the NFL and out, public awareness
original URL in the Internet Archive index).
18. Id.
19. Kevin Cook, Dying to Play, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 11, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/opinion/head-injuries-in-football.html.
20. Head Injuries in Football, supra note 17.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.; See also Cook, supra note 19 (“John Mackey, the pioneering president of
the N.F.L.’s Players’ Association, was found to have frontal temporal dementia in his
early 60’s. Former Bears safety Dave Duerson was 50 years old when he committed
suicide, shooting himself in the chest so that his brain could be studied. (It showed
signs of C.T.E.) Junior Seau, a 12-time Pro Bowler for the Chargers, was 43 when he
shot himself in the chest last spring.”).
26. Head Injuries in Football, supra note 17.
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heightened and the long-term side effects of concussions
became a popular concern.27 The injuries across the sport have
led to the claim that “football has become the site of perhaps
the gravest health crisis in the history of sports.”28
Many spectators, sports analysts and physicians alike
have commented on player injuries sustained during NFL
games. Naturally, these statements increase in seriousness as
the injury being discussed increases in severity. Dr. James
Kelly, of the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago, has noted,
Shots to the head must be outlawed and penalized with suspension,
and even expulsion, from the sport. The seriousness of concussion
needs to be addressed with serious consequences for those who
inflict them. As we see, a career can be ended by concussion. So
should the career of habitual head injury perpetrators.29

As Director of the Brain Injury program, Dr. Kelly is an
expert in concussions.30
Dr. Kelly is not alone in his harsh opinion of rule violators
who are prone to cause injury. The NFL itself takes a similar,
albeit diluted, stance. Today, penalties for personal fouls are
punishable by 15 yards, with the potential addition of a fine if
the hit is severe enough.31 Additionally, NFL Commissioner
Roger Goodell has implemented player suspensions for
unnecessary roughness in the NFL’s quest to limit and
discipline potential injury-causing conduct.32
While players’ salaries have grown to seven figures, their
longevity has also become a larger concern for the league.33 As
27. Id. (“In October 2010 [a] helmet-first collision caused the paralysis of a Rutgers
University player.”).
28. Lawyers refer to concussions in NFL as ‘gravest health crisis in history of
sports’; Football There are more than 5,000 individuals suing the National Football
League, THE TELEGRAPH-JOURNAL, Nov. 1, 2012, at B6.
29. Alexander N. Hecht, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Sports-Related Concussions:
The Merril Hoge Story, 12 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 17, 60 (2002).
30. Id.; See also Brain Injury Rehabilitation Services, REHABILITATION INSTITUTE
OF CHICAGO, http://www.ric.org/conditions/brain/services/ (Last visited Mar. 18, 2013)
(The Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago’s Brain Injury Program is part of a teaching
and a research institution with specialties in concussions as well as other traumatic
brain injury.).
31. Linda S. Calvert Hanson & Craig Dernis, Revisiting Excessive Violence in the
Professional Sports Arena: Changes in the Past Twenty Years?, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORTS
& ENT. L. 127, 159 (1996).
32. Ray Fittipaldo, Players Question NFL’s Call on Stand-in Referees, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/sports/steelers/
players-question-nfls-call-on-stand-in-referees-654908/.
33. Hanson & Dernis, supra note 31, at 159.
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early as 1995, then Buffalo Bills coach, Marv Levy, remarked,
“The Competition Committee [of the NFL] [is] consistently
making a concerted effort to help protect players from
injury.”34 According to Commissioner Goodell’s statement in
the NFL’s 2012 Health and Safety Report, in addition to the
longevity of players’ careers, the NFL has an explicit interest
in ensuring that players are safe to pursue their goals off of
the field.35 In keeping with this interest, the NFL has already
invested $22 million in funding to research and improve
player safety with an additional $100 million to be invested
within the next ten years.36 Of this $100 million, $30 million
has already been granted to the Foundation for the National
Institute of Health—making it the largest donation in the
history of the league.37
Additionally, prior to the commencement of the 2013
season, the NFL reached a tentative agreement with more
than 4,500 retired players regarding concussion-related
litigation.38 The agreement provides that the NFL will create
a $756 million fund that will be accessible to retired players
and their families.39 The fund will allocate $10 million for
medical and safety research, and, upon a finding of individual
necessity, the fund will provide payments for medical benefits
and injury compensation.40 While the terms of the settlement
remain in negotiation, the apparent goal of the NFL is clear.
The amount of capital being invested in the safety of players
reflects the NFL’s concerns with the rate of injury in the
league. Perhaps the NFL’s concern is in fact genuine,
considering that rule changes are implemented despite harsh
reactions from both fans and players who view attempts to
limit contact as destructive to the game.41
34. Id. at 160.
35. Roger Goodell, Foreward, NFL FALL 2012 HEALTH & SAFETY REPORT, 2 (2012).
36. John York, M.D., Welcome to the Fall 2012 NFL Health & Safety Report, NFL
FALL 2012 HEALTH & SAFETY REPORT, 3 (2012).
37. Id.
38. NFL, Retired Players Resolve Concussion Litigation; Court-Appointed
Mediatory Hails “Historic” Agreement, NFL COMMUNICATIONS (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://nflcommunications.com/2013/08/29/settlement-of-concussion-litigation/.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Chris Chase, NFL Players Speak out on the NFL’s Awful, New Dangerous Hit
Rule,
YAHOO!
SPORTS
BLOG
(Oct.
20,
2012,
10:35
AM),
http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/blog/shutdown_corner/post/NFL-players-speak-out-on-theNFL-s-awful-new-da?urn=nfl-278498.
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However, without implementation by coordinated, trained,
and prepared referees, these rule changes are likely to be
ineffective. The NFL’s highly regarded referee corps is the
only force standing between the rules on paper and the rules
in play. According to the NFL, referee applicants must have a
minimum of ten years of officiating experience, five of which
must be conducted on a collegiate or professional field.42 For
all intents and purposes, it appears that the group of 2012
replacements barely met the lowest requirements. Allegedly,
this group consists of college officials, none of who had any
experience in Division 1 football, one former Lingerie Football
League (LFL) official who was released by the LFL for
incompetence, and other referees who had only officiated
“glorified high school games.”43
Regardless of whether the League had successfully
collected the most qualified group of available substitute
referees willing to officiate, the NFL’s support of these
replacements led to much secrecy regarding their résumés.44
Although the NFL defended the credentials of its
replacements, its credibility suffered as information about the
replacements’ history surfaced.45 In August 2012, as the
preseason opened and rumors began to spread, specifically
regarding official Craig Ochoa and the Lingerie Football
League, the NFL immediately denied that he had been let go
from his previous position with the LFL.46 However, in
42. Frequently Asked Questions: How Can I Become an NFL Official, NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://www.nfl.com/help/faq (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
43. Sam Borden, With Referees Out, N.F.L. Stars Throw Flag on Novice Fill-Ins,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/sports/football/calls-bysome-nfl-replacement-referees-raise-concerns.html; Houston Mitchell, NFL referees:
Lingerie Football League says NFL is using ref it fired, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Sept. 26,
2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/print/2012/sep/26/sports/la-sp-sn-lingerie-footballleague-20120926; Rose Eveleth, What’s the Deal With The NFL’s Replacement Referees?,
SMITHSONIAN
MAGAZINE
BLOG
(Sept.
17,
2012,
9:44
AM),
http://blogs.smithsonianmag.com/smartnews/2012/09/whats-the-deal-with-the-nflsreplacement-referees/.
44. Former NFL Chief Referee: NFL Is Lying About the Experience of Replacement
Refs, CBS CHICAGO (Aug. 7, 2012), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2012/08/07/pereirareplacement-refs-will-only-hurt-the-nfl/. (Division 1 Referees are unlikely to participate
as replacement referees for several reasons, including (1) they know the position is
temporary and (2) taking the position could impede their ability to receive a full time
NFL position in the future.).
45. Mike Florio, League counters Pereira’s claim of embellished credentials, NBC
SPORTS: PROFOOTBALLTALK (Aug. 7, 2012), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com
/2012/08/07/league-counters-pereiras-claim-of-embellished-credentials/.
46. Id.
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September 2012, LFL commissioner, Mitch Mortaza, came
forward expressing his “shock to see guys that couldn’t
officiate in [the LFL] were officiating in the NFL.”47 Not only
did Mortaza confirm Ochoa had in fact been let go, but he
alluded also to reasons, such as missed calls and poor
judgment, that “opened up [LFL] players for potential
injury.”48 If true, these inadequacies have obvious
implications. However, without actual proof of employment
and termination for any of the replacements, it becomes
impossible to draw the line between truth and embellishment.
In addition to concerns for basic qualification, the
replacement referees were unprepared to officiate a
professional football season without on-field guidance from
veteran officials. Under normal circumstance, a new referee
gains experience while observing and interacting with those
who have already adjusted to the job.49 In a typical season, no
more than one rookie referee is assigned to an officiating
crew.50 As Jim Tunney, a retired official with 31 years of NFL
experience, stated, “[w]hen I started, I had only a few years in
Division 1, but I had a lot of other officials around me who
could help me. Who are these guys going to ask?”51
Replacement referee, Jerry Frump, admitted that the
replacements, as a group, were not ready for the challenge
ahead of them because they “didn’t have [the] experience.” 52
The replacements came into the season without the luxury of
being able to rely on their more experienced co-officials. Thus,
penalties were overlooked, ignored, or unnoticed. In addition,
the booth review, which had been extended to accommodate
replacement referees, was of little assistance.53 Instead of the
47. Borden, supra note 43. (“For a number of reasons, high-level college officials
are reluctant to moonlight in the N.F.L. as replacements. They do not want to appear
disloyal to their college conference supervisors . . . or jeopardize their current positions
with little chance of remaining in the pros after the labor issue is settled.”); see also
Mitchell, supra note 43.
48. Mitchell, supra note 43.
49. Craig Wolf, So You Want to be an NFL Referee? As the Replacement Officials
Showed,
It’s
Not
Easy,
NJ.COM
(Sept.
30,
2012),
http://www.nj.com/giants/index.ssf/2012/09/so_you_want_to_be_an_nfl_refer.html#.
50. Id.
51. Borden, supra note 43.
52. Sean Gregory, I Was a Replacement Ref: Inside the NFL’s 7 Weirdest Weeks,
TIME SPORTS BLOG (Sept. 28, 2012), http://keepingscore.blogs.time.com/2012/09/28/areplacement-ref-reflects-did-the-nfl-overlook-an-obvious-experience-gap/.
53. Dan Levy, Horrible NFL Replacement Officials May Be Good for the League
Long
Term,
BLEACHER
REPORT
(Sept.
18,
2012),
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on-field officials controlling close plays, a booth reviewer had
the responsibility of judging whether calls were close enough
to warrant a second look. This additional review also allowed
for consultation with a rule interpreter; however, the
replacements failed to make appropriate calls despite these
safety nets.54
One of the few individuals supporting the replacements
was cornerback Cortland Finnegan.55 However, admiration
from someone known for “[aspiring] to be the dirtiest player in
the league,” is not positive support when his intention is to
commend the replacements for not appropriately enforcing
the rules.56 With the reputation of replacements known to
players such as Finnegan, there was a greater risk that the
officials’ inexperience would be taken advantage of, leading to
an increase in injuries.57 If the NFL was as concerned with
player safety as its public statements warrant, an
environment where players were more susceptible to injury
should have been avoided.
II. NLRA §143: HISTORY & REQUIREMENTS
The statute 29 U.S.C. § 143 applies to employees operating
under an employment contract or collective bargaining
agreement that contains a no strike provision, either
expressly or impliedly.58 Under this law, “[T]he quitting of
labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of
abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of
employment of such employee or employees [shall not] be
deemed a strike.”59 When § 143 is invoked, courts utilize a
four-part test to analyze the dangers in the workplace.60 For
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1338578-nfl-horrible-replacement-officials-may-begood-for-the-league-long-term.
54. Id.
55. Michael David Smith, Cortland Finnegan likes Replacements: “They let you
play football,” NBC SPORTS: PROFOOTBALLTALK (Sept. 19, 2012, 4:40 PM),
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2012/09/19/cortland-finnegan-likes-replacementsthey-let-you-play-football/.
56. Id.
57. Benjamin Hoffman, Criticism of N.F.L. Replacement Officials Builds, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/sports/football/criticism-ofnfl-replacement-officials-builds.html.
58. TNS, Inc. (TNS I), 309 NLRB 1348, 1451 (N.L.R.B. 1992); TNS, Inc. v.
N.L.R.B. (TNS II), 296 F.3d 384, 390 (6th Cir. 2002).
59. 29 U.S.C. §143 ( 2012).
60. TNS II, 296 F.3d at 389.
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a claim to be successful, workers must show, based upon a
preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) they must have
believed in good faith that an abnormally dangerous condition
existed in their workplace; (2) this belief must have caused
the work stoppage; (3) the belief must be supported by
objective, ascertainable evidence; and (4) the dangerous
condition must have posed an immediate risk of harm.61
Unfortunately, there is no clear definition of “abnormally
dangerous.”62 Thus, establishing this condition is determined
on a case-by-case basis by the National Labor Relations Board
in the first instance.63 Under these circumstances, courts have
relied on a working definition of “abnormal,” which conveys a
condition that is “deviating from the normal. . . or average.”64
Football is an inherently dangerous sport. For the
replacement referees to constitute an abnormally dangerous
condition, they must have created additional elements of
danger that were not previously present on a regular basis.
The conditions of good faith and causation may be
assumed. NFL players have a strong interest in preserving
their own safety. Thus, there was little motive to be dishonest
with the NFL in expressing their intent to do so. The
circumstances surrounding the potential 2012 strike did not
support the belief that the players may have had ulterior
motives. In the past, ulterior motives have been noted at
times when an abnormally dangerous work condition surfaced
coincidentally at the expiration of a collective bargaining
agreement.65 In the 2012 season, the NFLPA had entered a
collective bargaining agreement with the NFL only one-year
prior.66 Therefore, the Player’s Association was not focusing
on the issue of safety to disguise its underlying economic
interest. Assuming the existence of good faith, the NFL
Player’s Association’s strike discussion indicated no purpose
other than the concern for safety; no valid assumption can be
made that an alternative purpose existed. 67 Thus, the proper
analysis must consider the requirements of objective and
61. Id. at 389 (emphasis added).
62. TNS I, 309 NLRB at 1357.
63. Id.
64. John B. Flood, Revisiting The Right To Refuse Hazardous Work Amidst The
Anthrax Crisis of 2001, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 545, 564 (2003).
65. TNS II, 296 F.3d at 395.
66. NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Aug. 4, 2011.
67. See Fittipaldo, supra note 32.
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ascertainable evidence, and what constitutes an immediate
risk of harm.
A. Objective & Ascertainable Evidence
No matter how honest a belief in danger may be, if it is
unreasonable or cannot be substantiated by objective
evidence, it will not be upheld.68 However, the issue remains
as to what constitutes objective and ascertainable evidence.
Evidence is objective if a reasonable person might also
consider the condition abnormally dangerous.69 Employees in
similar fields would likely share the same opinion as the
employee(s) in question as to whether hazards in the work
environment were abnormal.70 This evidence can be
ascertained through opinion testimony of an employee as to
the conditions that he or she has observed.71 Thus, the
evidence presented must meet the reasonable person
standard and must be objective in so far as it will allow the
fact finder to identify the facts.
B. Immediate Risk of Harm
In establishing a claim under NLRA §143, it is not
necessary to prove that the conditions were “in fact”
abnormally dangerous, nor does an employee have to
“actually manifes[t] physical injury or [be] on the verge of
doing so as a result of [the] conditions.”72 A principal case on
the matter, TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, states that the failure of a
regulatory agency to shut a place of business down for health
and safety reasons despite its authority to do so does not
68. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 386 (1974);
see also TNS, Inc. (TNS I), 309 NLRB 1348, 1357 (N.L.R.B. 1992) (“What controls is not
the state of mind of the employee or employees concerned, but whether the actual
working conditions shown to exist by competent evidence might in the circumstances
reasonably be considered ‘abnormally dangerous.’”); See also TNS II, 296 F.3d at 392
(“[T]his circuit has held that the important question . . . is not whether abnormal
danger actually existed, but whether it was shown by objective evidence that
employees’ working conditions ‘might reasonably be considered ‘abnormally
dangerous.’”).
69. TNS II, 296 F.3d at 392.
70. Id.
71. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Knight Morley, 251 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir. 1957)
(“Laymen may testify as to physical conditions which they themselves have observed.”).
72. TNS I, 309 NLRB at 1356.
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mean that an abnormal danger does not exist.73 In the
instance referred to, the abnormally dangerous condition in
fact was not in question.74 The employees’ belief of such a
condition was the predominant issue.75 However, while the
condition does not have to be proven to in fact exist, there
must be a “presently existing threat” or “immediate danger.”76
This requirement is not satisfied merely because an already
existing threat in the work place becomes more than the
employee cares to handle.77 The relevant test, therefore, must
establish, based on objective evidence, that an inherently
dangerous condition has “changed significantly for the worse”
and now poses “a substantial threat of imminent danger.”78
III. APPLICABILITY OF NLRA § 143
In the first forty years of the statute’s existence, only six
instances of abnormally dangerous conditions were found. 79 In
these six cases, there were findings of immediate dangers that
were “substantially greater than those presented by normally
existing conditions” at the workplace.80 Thus, in order to
successfully assert that NLRA § 143 is appropriate for the
NFLPA, it would have had to do the same and establish that
73. TNS II, 296 F.3d at 398.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 385 (1974).
77. TNS I, 309 NLRB at 1358 (“[W]ork which is recognized and accepted by
employees as inherently dangerous does not become ‘abnormally dangerous’ merely
because employee patience with prevailing conditions wears thing or their forbearance
ceases.”).
78. Id. at 1357 (Noting that in its original form, this test had two parts and was
applied to workers that were exposed to radioactive and/or toxic substances in the
workplace. The test’s two parts for proving an abnormally dangerous condition were:
“[E]ither (1) that inherently dangerous conditions in the subject workplace had changed
significantly for the worse, so as to impose a substantial threat of imminent danger if
exposure were continued at the time the employees began to withhold their services, or
(2) that the cumulative effects of exposure to those substances had reached the point at
which any further exposure would pose an unacceptable risk of future injury to
employees.”).
79. Richmond Tank Car Co., 264 NLRB 174 (1982); Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 224
NLRB 542 (1976); Roadway Express, Inc., 217 NLRB 278 (1975); Fruin-Colnon
Construction Co., 139 NLRB 894 (1962), enforcement denied, 330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir.
1964); Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass’n, 138 NLRB 737 (1962), enforced, 330 F.2d 492
(3d Cir. 1964); Knight Morley Corp., 116 NLRB 140 (1956), enforced, 251 F.2d 753 (6th
Cir. 1957).
80. TNS I, 309 NLRB at 1357.
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playing conditions had changed. As previously stated, good
faith and causation need not be questioned;81 the focus of the
analysis, therefore, is on whether there is ascertainable,
objective evidence that will support a finding of an
abnormally dangerous condition, and whether the player
employees were at risk of immediate harm because of this
condition.82
A. Objective & Ascertainable Evidence
To determine whether there was ascertainable and
objective evidence, the NFLPA would have had to first look to
the standards set forth in prior case law in order to establish
its NLRA § 143 claim. Objective evidence is that which will
convince a person to reasonably decide that a dangerous
condition exists.83 Such objective evidence is found when a
person in a similar field of employment would agree with a
statement made regarding the safety of a working condition.84
The case providing this standard involved a truck driver who
stated that his vehicle was not safe to drive, and based on
agreement from other drivers, the evidence was “objective
enough . . . to lead a person to reasonably determine that he
should not drive such a truck.”85
1. Players’ Opinions Submitted as Objective Evidence
With this as the standard for objective evidence, the
opinions of all players would have to have been evaluated to
determine whether they generally believed a dangerous
condition existed and whether that condition was
substantially different from typical on-field experience.86
Although the opinions of players were never collectively
compiled, their opinions of the replacements were no secret. 87
New York Giants defensive end Mathias Kiwanuka said that,
in reviewing the calls that the replacement referees were
81. See Fittipaldo, supra note 32.
82. TNS I, 309 NLRB at 1357.
83. TNS, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (TNS II), 296 F.3d 384, 392 (6th Cir. 2002).
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Roadway Express, Inc., 217 NLRB 278, 280 (1975)).
86. Id.; TNS I, 309 NLRB at 1357.
87. Ian Begley, Ex-ref: Roger Goodell Doesn’t Care, ESPN (Sept. 18, 2012, 8:19
PM), http://espn.go.com/new-york/nfl/story/_/id/8396189/former-referee-jerry-markbreitblasts-nfl-roger-goodell-use-replacement-officials.
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missing, “player safety is the big issue.”88 Defensive lineman
Justin Tuck of the Giants agreed.89 He mentioned specifically
that he witnessed pass interference “at a high rate” that had
not been called, as well as holding.90 Tuck stated that, when
rules are not followed because the replacements are not
making calls, “[y]ou get guys that (are) getting pulled down
and get hamstring (injuries); you get all these different types
of things that could happen and player safety becomes an
issue.”91 Kiwanuka agreed that, when “you let people get
away with stuff, they’re going to continue to do it.”92
Philadelphia Eagles receiver Jason Avant reiterated this
sentiment.93 He even went so far as to say, “[g]uys are going to
kind of cheat” when they know what the replacements are
going to ignore.94 It is clear that, even if some players were
not worried about their own safety, they knew that the
replacement referees were creating an environment in which
rules were not strictly followed and they saw this as an
opportunity to be more aggressive.95
In addition to comments that many players and coaches
made regarding the replacements, others directly
reprimanded the officials for their inadequacies. Larry Foote,
Pittsburg Steelers linebacker, was seen chasing an official off
the field to confront him—he believed that an uncalled illegal
chop block had injured his teammate.96 Cortland Finnegan
aside, it is obvious that there was a general concern for the
ability of the replacements to officiate in a manner that would
protect the safety of players.
2. Replacement Referee Performance
What then must be considered is whether these concerns
were reasonable or justified enough to be considered objective.
For this, we can look to what actually happened on the field
during the reign of the replacement referees. Aside from the
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Replacement Officials Taking Heat, ESPN (Sept, 18, 2012, 6:27 PM),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/8394294/nfl-coaches-players-fed-fill-refs.
94. Id.
95. Smith, supra note 55.
96. Fittipaldo, supra note 32.
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errors in marking balls, or the inaccuracy in applying the
correct number of yards to a penalty, what solidified the
players’ concern for their safety were the missed calls that led
to injury. Unfortunately for the players, as well as for the
reputations of the replacement referees, injury did in fact
happen.97 Fortunately, the injury was not serious enough to
end the season or career of its victim, but it did establish the
danger present on the field.98 During the last week under the
replacement referees, Darrius Heyward-Bey, Oakland Raiders
receiver, was hit with helmet-to-helmet contact, immediately
became unconscious, and thereafter suffered a neck strain
and concussion.99 The hit, even though it ultimately required
Heyward-Bey to be taken from the field on a stretcher, was
not penalized by the replacements.100 This was precisely the
kind of injury that the NFLPA feared would be caused by the
inadequacies of the replacement officials. The injury
establishes the dangerous condition that existed on the field
under the control of the replacement referees.
A possible second basis for assessing the adequacy of
referees is the rate at which coaches’ challenges overturned a
call on the field, but this would be without merit. Over the
past five years, the rate of overturned rulings has consistently
increased—the highest being a 53% rate of plays overturned
by coaches’ challenges.101 In the 2012 season, for the first time
in five years, the rate dramatically decreased. With only 31%
of play calls being overturned through Week 2 of the regular
season, it may seem that the replacements were making the
appropriate calls.102 However, the reason for this decrease is
the booth review, in more than one respect.103 The statistic
97. Sam R. Quinn, Darrius Heyward-Bey Injury: Updates on Raiders WR’s Head
Inury, BLEACHER REPORT (Sept. 23, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1345172darrius-heyward-bey-injury-updates-on-raiders-wrs.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Barry Wilner, Replacement Refs Create Chaos In NFL Week 3, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 23, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/23/replacement-refschaos-nfl-week-3-49ers-challenges_n_1908131.html.
101. Kevin Clark, The NFL Replacement Ref Audit, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
(Sept. 19, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443816804578004
613701813182.html.
102. Id.
103. Mike Florio, Replacement Ref “Audit” Misses the Point, NBC SPORTS:
PROFOOTBALLTALK (Sept. 21, 2012), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2012/09/21/
replacement-ref-audit-misses-the-point/.
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neither includes the rate at which referees’ decisions were
overturned when the replay was initiated by the booth—
instead of the coach—nor does it consider that, in a typical
NFL game, the referees on the field review the calls that
coaches challenge, not the booth.104 Therefore, the booth
reviewer in this instance is technically also a replacement—at
least with respect to the job that he or she is performing when
assessing coaches’ challenges.105 Additionally, the rate of
challenge does not indicate every incorrect or missed call.
Alternatively, the league-generated referee grades, which
are based on a play-by-play analysis of each game, should be
assessed.106 In Week 1 alone, before the replacements had
made any significant mistakes and before the criticism had
reached an apex, the average officiating errors per game
exceeded thirty, as opposed to the single digit averages of the
regular officials.107
Setting statistics aside, the NFL admittedly “trained,
championed, and cultivated” its referee corps in order to
enhance safety, and without them, safety became a prominent
issue.108 Players agreed that, with the NFL regarding safety
so highly and fining players to further that interest, it was
counterintuitive to have officials on the field who were unable
to protect the safety of players.109
3. Reports from Relevant Regulator Agencies
Additionally, objective evidence in other settings has been
found in the reports of regulatory agencies regarding safety
violations in a work place. In the leading case on the matter,
TNS, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed a prior decision of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) in which the Board found that, although an
abnormally dangerous condition may not have existed in fact,
the employees provided objective evidence to suggest that
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Matt Brooks, NFL to teams: Replacement referees will work Week 1, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/earlylead/post/nfl-to-teams-replacement-referees-will-work-week-1/2012/08/29/13f9669ef204-11e1-a612-3cfc842a6d89_blog.html.
109. Begley, supra note 87.
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their belief in the abnormally dangerous condition was
reasonable.110 The TNS employees were exposed to depleted
uranium, a radioactive and carcinogenic substance, in their
work place.111 While the employees were exposed to this
carcinogen daily, the rates of exposure were regulated by the
appropriate state agency.112 The regulatory agency issued
several citations to TNS for health and safety violations;
however, no further action was taken.113 The employer did not
completely alleviate the condition, nor did the employees
immediately stop work.114 However, when the employer
sought to use the employees’ continued work as evidence of
their acceptance of the safety hazards, and of the absence of
an abnormally dangerous condition, the NLRB justified the
employees’ ultimate work stoppage.115 It found that the safety
standard violations were enough to establish a good faith
belief in the dangerous condition.116 While the Sixth Circuit
in TNS did not find the evidence provided to be substantial
enough to support this finding,117 the court did decide that the
NLRB may find objective evidence to support an employee’s
belief in an abnormally dangerous condition, despite the
inaction of the relevant regulatory agencies.118
Thus, in addition to players’ reasonable beliefs as objective
evidence regarding the safety on the field, the NFLPA may
also look to comments made by the NFL in order to implicate
the NLRA § 143 exception to the no-strike provision. While a
fine imposed on a player is not the NFL’s “comment” in a
strict sense, the fines assessed during the use of replacement
referees certainly send a message. The NFL, notwithstanding
its attempts to downplay the negative attention generated by
the replacement referees, has implicitly acknowledged the
officials’ inadequacies by issuing fines for penalty-free play.
Once the NFL has imposed a fine, it has also conceded that
the activity was in fact illegal, and, generally speaking,
should have been called on the field.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

TNS, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (TNS II), 296 F.3d 384, 398 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 387.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 398.
Id.
Id.
TNS II, 296 F.3d at 398.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 400.
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The League’s message was obvious after the Week 1 fines
were issued: despite replacement officials missing penalties,
players would be held accountable for their illegal actions.
Everson Griffin, Minnesota Vikings defensive lineman, was
fined $15,750 for his only Week 1 hit.119 This hit, although
ignored by the replacement officials, inflicted helmet-tohelmet contact to Jacksonville Jaguars quarterback, Blaine
Gabbert.120 Griffin was not the only player to be fined after a
game for a penalty that was not called on the field.121 Golden
Tate of the Seattle Seahawks was fined $21,000 for an illegal
block against Sean Lee of the Dallas Cowboys.122 Tate used
the crown of his helmet to inflict a blindside hit on Lee,
violating Rule 12 of the Official Playing Rules of the NFL.123
The hit was not penalized on the field, but the NFL
recognized it as an oversight by replacement officials.124 This
is precisely the dangerous play that can occur without proper
rule implementation.125 The NFL’s fines for behavior exhibited
on the field indicates its concession that illegal activity is
occurring, and the publicity of the flagless fines only further
exposes the NFL’s knowledge of the replacement referees’
failures.
The fines implemented for illegal activity, typically hits
made illegal for safety reasons, are comparable to the safety
citations in TNS, Inc.126 The NFL, the ultimate regulatory
authority in the situation, recognized the safety issues by
imposing fines for the behavior; however, as an employer, it
did not do its utmost to alleviate the dangerous situation. 127
As in TNS, Inc., the fines may not be enough for the NFLPA
119. Tim Yotter, Griffen fined $15,750 for Hit on Gabbert, SCOUT (Sept. 14, 2012),
http://scouthoops.scout.com/a.z?s=75&p=9&c=2&cid=1221595&nid=3286517&fhn=1&p
g=4&yr=2010.
120. Id.
121. Michael David Smith, NFL fines Golden Tate $21,000 for block on Sean Lee,
NBC SPORTS: PROFOOTBALLTALK (Sept. 19, 2012), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.
com/2012/09/19/nfl-fines-golden-tate-21000-for-block-on-sean-lee/.
122. Id.
123. Roger Goodell, Official Playing Rules and Casebook of the National Football
League, NFL (2012) (“Rule 12, Section 2, Article 6: Unnecessary Roughness. There shall
be no unnecessary roughness. This shall include, but will not be limited to: . . . (h) using
any part of a player’s helmet (including the top/crown and forehead/’hairline’ parts) or
facemask to butt, spear, or ram an opponent violently or unnecessarily.”).
124. Smith, supra note 121.
125. Id.
126. TNS II, 296 F.3d at 398.
127. Smith, supra note 121.
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to establish that a dangerous working condition in fact
existed.128 However, the NFL’s failure to take more immediate
action when signing a CBA with the NFLRA, despite the
safety issues posed by the replacements, does not preclude the
NFLPA from establishing its reasonable belief that an
abnormally dangerous condition did exist.129
4. The NFL’s Prior Dedication to Safety
The NFL has not concealed its intention to make
alterations to the game in order to protect the safety of
players. DeMaurice Smith, NFLPA Executive Director, has
noted, “The NFL has chosen to prevent the very officials that
they have trained, championed and cultivated for decades to
be on the field to protect players and—by their own
admission—further our goal of enhanced safety. That is
absurd on its face.”130 During the 2011 season, the NFL
initiated concussion awareness training for referees, most
notably due to San Diego Chargers lineman Kris Dielman’s
seizure after an undiagnosed and unaddressed concussion. 131
The replacement referees did not have the opportunity to
internalize the concussion awareness techniques developed in
this training, like the rules in general.132 Although they were
given “concise” concussion training, this information was in
addition to the regular rules training.133 The overload of
information coupled with inexperience, high intensity on the
field, and the lack of time available to absorb the material,
meant the replacements were not equipped to effectively
apply the condensed version of the training they had been
128. TNS II, 296 F.3d at 403.
129. Id. at 400.
130. Samano, supra note 1 (Smith notes several points in the safety of the game:
“One, the players and the league have made tremendous strides in trying to make the
game safer over the last three years. . .The second fact is, at the players’ urging, the
National Football League last year gave the referees more power to spot and deal with
a concussed or injured player. The third inescapable fact is, over the last 20 years the
league has done everything to maintain an experienced referee corps.”).
131. Mark Maske, NFL to educate game officials on recognizing players’ concussions
after Kris Dielman incident, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2011),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-11-02/sports/35284056_1_concussion-kevinguskiewicz-spine-medical-committee.
132. Sean Gregory, Will Replacement Refs Put NFL Players’ Safety at Risk, TIME
BLOG: KEEPING SCORE (Aug. 31, 2012), http://keepingscore.blogs.time.com/2012/08/31/
will-replacement-refs-put-nfl-players-safety-at-risk/.
133. Id.
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given.134
The league has insisted on creating a safer environment
for players, yet while it impliedly and explicitly acknowledged
the deficiency in the replacement staff and continued to
prolong the CBA negotiations, the safety of players was at
risk. For players, there was a vast difference between trained,
experienced, properly qualified referees and the less
competent replacement staff. The replacements, through no
fault of their own, were under-qualified for the positions they
were given. Because of their inexperience, they put the
players at risk by creating an abnormally dangerous condition
on an already dangerous field.
B. Immediate Risk of Harm
In order to fully understand the risk of harm that the
players faced, both the causal chain leading to, and the
severity of, the potential injuries must be considered. As
stated by the concerned players, the higher risk of injury with
the replacement referees resulted from their inefficiency in
calling fouls.135 Because calls were being missed, players were
more inclined to push the replacements in order to see what
would and what would not be called. Therefore, they were
more physical and, in some cases, disregarded or took
advantage of rules designed to prevent injury.136 Nevertheless,
if a player delivers a strong hit, whether said hit is penalized
is irrelevant to the potential risk of injury. However, injuries
were likely to stem from the players’ conception that they
could “get away with” illegal behavior, and furthermore, that
it was permissible to try to get away with this behavior.137
Therefore, although the replacements themselves were not
directly causing the injury, their lack of control of the game
and their reputations among players were the proximate
cause of a more physical, unnecessarily dangerous game.
IV. CONCLUSION
Inexperienced officials will inevitably make mistakes in
play calls before they grow accustomed to the fast pace and
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Begley, supra note 87.
Id.; See also Smith, supra note 55.
See Begley, supra note 87.
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high energy in an NFL game. For this reason, under usual
circumstances, the NFL places only one rookie referee in each
game.138 The potential for mistakes in employing an entire
officiating crew of rookies is limitless. During the reign of the
replacement referees, calls were missed during every game,
some more obvious than others.139 Even the NFL was
compelled to release a statement regarding the missed
offensive pass interference call in the Green Bay v. Seattle
game that resulted in a Seattle touchdown and cost Green
Bay the game.140 While the “W” was taken from the Packers,
the NFL chose not to alter the record of either team because,
without the pass interference call, a lack of which was not
reviewable, the elements of the play that were reviewable
would not overturn the touchdown.141 Even amid
campaigning, President Obama and Vice Presidential
Candidate Paul Ryan took to the media to comment on the
performance of the replacement officials after this
particularly unfortunate display.142
The presence of the replacement officials created an
abnormally dangerous condition that put the safety of players
at risk of immediate harm. As stated, in order to legally stop
work due to this condition, despite the NFLPA and NFL’s
CBA, the NFLPA would have had to establish that (1) players
believed in good faith that an abnormally dangerous condition
existed on the field; (2) this belief must have caused the
strike; (3) the belief must have been supported by objective,
ascertainable evidence; and (4) the dangerous condition must
have posed an immediate risk of harm.143 The actions of the
replacement referees established their under-qualification
through their inability to perform the necessary tasks of
officiating and enforcing the NFL rules that prevent injury
138. Wolf, supra note 49.
139. Michael David Smith, Packers fans protest at Lambeau Field, NBC SPORTS:
PROFOOTBALLTALK (Sept. 25, 2012), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2012/09/25/
packers-fans-protest-at-lambeau-field/.
140. NFL Statement on Final Play of Green Bay Packers-Seattle Seahawks Game,
NFL Communications (Sept. 25, 2012), http://nflcommunications.com/2012/09/25/nflstatement-on-final-play-of-green-bay-packers-seattle-seahawks-game/.
141. Id.
142. Margaret Chadbourn & Samuel P. Jacobs, Obama, Ryan Agree: NFL’s
Replacement
Officials
Need
Replacing,
REUTERS
(Sept.
25,
2012),
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE88O1EN20120925.
143. TNS, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (TNS II), 296 F.3d 384, 389 (6th Cir. 2002) (emphasis
added).
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and protect safety. All players seem to agree—the rules were
not being followed because infractions were not being
acknowledged.144 This lack of enforcement created a
dangerous field environment where players could not expect
the protection afforded by the rules.145 Thus, an already
dangerous game was transformed and the standard risks
became substantially greater in all respects. However, most
relevantly, the immediate risk of head injury expanded
gravely. As in any other circumstance where an individual in
a position of power is replaced, individuals will be inclined to
see what they can get away with. In this situation, players
were aware of the officials’ inadequacies and were able to
push the limits with certain rules. In doing so, their
opponents were put in a preventable position of danger.
The NFLPA would be able to establish that the
replacement referees constituted an abnormally dangerous
condition within the NFL that put the players’ safety at
immediate risk of harm. They therefore would have been able
to successfully strike, despite the “No Strike” provision of
their collective bargaining agreement.

144.
145.

Begley, supra note 87.
Id.

